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Abstract I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks
of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Par-
menidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we under-
stand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines
that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in ac-
cord with current scientific knowledge.
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Nature loves to hide.
Heraclitus, Fr. 123.
1 Introduction
There is an essential tension threading the metaphysical discussion in the
Western civilization along the last two and a half millennia. A tension be-
tween being and becoming, between substance and process, between things
and events. Plato famously attributed to Heraclitus the doctrine that change
is basic and that “all things are in flux” (DK 22A6)1. However, as I have
argued elsewhere (Romero 2012), there is nothing in the extant fragments of
Heraclitus that may compel us to think that he denied substance and material
Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomı´a (IAR, CCT La Plata, CONICET)
C.C. No. 5, 1894, Villa Elisa, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Tel.: +54-221-482-4903
Fax: +54-221-425-4909
E-mail: romero@iar-conicet.gov.ar
1 See also Aristotle: “[Plato] as a young man became familiar with Cratylus and the
Heraclitean doctrines that all sensible things are always flowing (undergoing Heraclitean
flux)” DK 65A3 (The notation refers to the doxography in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., Berlin, 1951.)
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things. Rather, on the contrary, the concept of material ‘thing’ seems to make
sense to Heraclitus only through change:
By changing it is at rest.
(DK 22B84a)
Heraclitus, moreover, seems to share some ontological concerns with Par-
menides, as shown in following fragment:
[It] is wise to agree that all things are one.
(DK 22B123)
It can be argued, on the basis of the extant fragments, that change is
for Heraclitus a way to achieve the stability necessary for being (McKirahan
1994). If the waters of the river do not change, the river is not a river but
a different thing, a lake. Some things can only be by changing. There is no
necessary opposition between being and becoming, but rather the suggestion
that becoming is the vehicle for being.
In this paper I want to transit a similar path, going from change to being.
In what follows I offer an ontological view where existent individuals can be
things or events, but in either case the ultimate reality is absolute being. I
shall start building change upon things, following, in broad lines, a Bungean
ontology (Bunge 1977, 1981). Then, I shall show how things can be construed
as bundles of events. In both cases, I argue, the World is the totality of events,
and such a totality is absolute and changeless being. I advocate for what
William James, not without scorn, called the “block universe”. I shall suggest
that such a view is in accord with modern science. I shall certainly not be
the first to maintain such position. The novelty is in the formal approach,
that admits different ontic primitives and the assimilation, rather than the
elimination, of becoming in a Parmenidean worldview.
2 Things
Individuals, whatever they are, associate with other individuals to yield new
individuals. It follows that they satisfy a calculus, and that they are rigorously
characterized only through the laws of such a calculus. These laws are set with
the aim of reproducing the way real existents associate. Specifically, it can be
postulated that every individual is an element of a set s in such a way that the
structure S = 〈s, ◦,〉 is a commutative monoid of idempotents (see Bunge
1977). This is a simple additive semi-group with neutral element.
In the structure S, s is the set of all individuals, the element  ∈ s is a
fiction called the null individual (e.g. Martin 1965, Bunge 1966), and the binary
operation ◦ is the association of individuals. Although S is a mathematical
entity, the elements of s are not, with the only exception of, which is a virtual
individual introduced to form a calculus. The association of any element of s
From change to spacetime 3
with  yields the same element. The following definitions characterize the
composition of individuals2.
1. x ∈ s is composed ⇔ (∃y, z)s0 (x = y ◦ z)
2. x ∈ s is simple ⇔ ¬ (∃y, z)s0 (x = y ◦ z)
3. x ⊂ y ⇔ x ◦ y = y (x is part of y ⇔ x ◦ y = y)
4. Comp(x) ≡ {y ∈ s0 | y ⊂ x} is the composition of x.
In definitions 1, 2 and 4, s0 is s−{}. Individuals, so far, are ontologically
neutral. We have introduced no specification of their nature.
An individual with its properties make up a thing X . We can represent
things through ordered pairs:
X = 〈x,P(x)〉 .
Here P(x) is the collection of properties of the individual x. A material
thing is an individual with material properties, i.e. properties that can change
(see below) in some respect.
Things are distinguished from abstract individuals because they have a
number of properties in addition to their capability of association. These prop-
erties can be intrinsic (Pi) or relational (Pr). The intrinsic properties are in-
herent and they are represented by predicates or unary applications, whereas
relational properties depend upon more than a single thing and are represented
by n-ary predicates, with n ≥ 1. Examples of intrinsic properties are electric
charge and rest mass, whereas velocity of macroscopic bodies and volume are
relational properties. Velocity (actually its modulus) is an intrinsic property
only in the case of photons and other bosons that move at the speed of light
in any reference system.
Basic things can be easily introduced in this ontology as those things that
are not composed by other things:
X is basic iff ¬(∃Y ) (Y ⊂ X),
or, equivalently,
Comp(X) ≡ ∅.
A thing Z is said to be composed or complex, if:
Z = X ◦ Y ≡ 〈x ◦ y,P(x ◦ y)〉 ,
where P (x ◦ y) not necessarily satisfies P(x ◦ y) = P(x) ∪ P(y). If a property
belongs to Z but not to X and Y , it is called an emergent property.
A fundamental methodological assumption of science is that properties can
be represented by mathematical functions. For instance, temperature can be
represented by a scalar field, velocity by a vector field, elasticity by a second
2 This calculus of individuals differs from that of Leonard and Goodman (1940) in several
aspects. Most notoriously, the inclusion of a virtual individual gives the set of all individuals
a definite mathematical (above the logical) structure.
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rank tensor field, and so on. When we represent a given thing, we specify a
set of functions that represent a collection of its properties.
The state of a thing X is a set of functions S(X) from a domain of reference
M (a set that can be enumerable or nondenumerable) to the set of properties
P(x). Every function in S(X) represents a property in P(x). We postulate:
(∀Pi)P(x)(∃Fi)S(X)(Fi=ˆPi).
Here, the subindex i runs over the different properties, =ˆ is the formal
relation of representation (Bunge 1974), and the domain of the bound variables
is made explicit.
Properties cannot change arbitrarily. There seems to be restrictions in the
way they change. We can introduce such restrictions as law statements. These
statements represent actual patterns of change in the world. Since properties
are represented by functions, law statements are expressed by differential equa-
tions, or by integro-differential equations. Only functions that satisfy these
equations can represent properties of existent (non-conceptual or material)
things. Solutions for the equations can only be found if adequate boundary
conditions are provided; hence the representation of any real thing must in-
clude its interaction with the environment, i.e. the rest of things.
The set of the physically accessible states of a thing X is the lawful state
space of X : SL(X) ⊂ S(X). The state of a thing is then represented by a point
in SL(X).
3 Changes and events
A change of a thing is any variation of its properties with respect to those
of another thing3. In other words, change is the transition of a thing from
one state to another. Only material things can change. Abstract things cannot
change since they have only one state in any reference system (their properties
are fixed by definition).
An event is a change of a thing X with respect to a thing Y . Events can
be represented by ordered pairs of states:
eYX = (s1, s2) ∈ E
Y
L (X) = SL(X)× SL(X).
The space EYL (X) is called the event space of X with respect to Y . A series
of lawful events in X , i.e. a continuous function over EL(X) with respect to
some reference thing, is a process in X . The totality of processes in a thing
forms the ontological history of the thing. Let us call h(X) the history of X in
some reference system. Then,
(∀X)(h(X) ⊂ EL(X)).
3 We call this second thing a reference system.
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If there are basic things, there could be basic events: eYX is basic iff X is
basic. For instance, the decay of a muon seems to be a basic event as far as
we know. All processes, on the contrary, are composed events.
Following Bunge (1977, p. 225) we can introduce a partial order relation
among events. Let e and e′ be two events in a given event space of a thing X :
e ∈ EL(X) and e
′ ∈ EL(X). Then, we say that e precedes (≺) e
′ if e ⋆ e′ ∈
EL(X). The operation of event composition ⋆ is defined by:
e = (si, sj) ∈ EL(X)∧ e
′ = (sl, sm) ∈ EL(X)→ e ⋆ e
′ = (si, sm) only ifj = l.
If j 6= l the operation ⋆ is not defined. For any given thing X and every
associated event space EL(X), 〈EL(X),≺〉 is a strictly partially ordered set.
Events in a thing X are ordered as far as they have a common state.
The Universe U is the composition of all things: (¬∃X)¬(X ⊂ U). Hence,
the Universe is the maximal thing. As all things, the Universe has properties,
and some of these properties can change respect to other properties of the
same system4. These changes determine the history of the Universe.
4 Events as individuals
Both Russell (1914) and Whitehead (1929) formulated the program of con-
sidering events as basic individuals. Process philosophers often present things
as “processual complexes possessing a functional unity instead of substances
individuated by a qualitative nature of some sort” (Rescher 1996). Things, in
this view, are construed as “manifolds of processes”. This project, however,
has never been accomplished in a rigorous way and in accordance to modern
science. There have been attempts to use the calculus of individuals of Leonard
and Goodman (1940) to provide an outline of a formal ontology of events (e.g.
Martin 1978), but the topological structure, based on the relation of prece-
dence, attributed to the set of all events (E) is far too poor to account for
some very general features of the world. Not all events can be related by a ≺-
order. In particular, in vast systems, where events are not causally connected,
the ≺-order can change with a change of reference system. More structure, in
particular a metric structure, is required to deal with the totality of events.
In what follows we shall consider events as individuals, and we shall develop
an ontological view of things as derivative from events. This ontology should
not be confused with the so-called ‘event calculus’, originally proposed in logic
programming form by Kowalski and Sergot (1986), which is a narrative-based
formalism for reasoning about actions and changes.
We shall assume that the composition of events obeys that of general in-
dividuals:
1. An event e1 ∈ E is composed ⇔ (∃e2, e3)E (e1 = e2 ⋆ e3)
2. An event e1 ∈ s is basic ⇔ ¬ (∃e2, e3)E (e1 = e2 ⋆ e3)
4 For instance, the energy density of the Universe can change with respect to its radius.
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3. e1 ⊂ e2 ⇔ e1 ⋆ e2 = e2 (e1 is part of e2 ⇔ e1 ⋆ e2 = e2)
4. Comp(e) ≡ {ei ∈ E | ei ⊂ e} is the composition of e.
We can introduce a virtual null event e0 stipulating that5:
(∀e)E(e
0 ⋆ e ≡ e).
The composition of all events is the World (W ):
¬(∃e)¬(e ⊂W ).
The World, W , should not be confused with the Universe, U , the compo-
sition of all things in a thing-based ontology as the one sketched in Sections
2 and 3. The Universe can change, i.e. events and processes take place in the
Universe. The World, the composition of all changes, can not change itself
because it is not a thing. In an ontology of events, the totality of events is
changeless, otherwise there would be a change not included in the totality,
which is absurd. Events do not change, they are changes. In the sense used
here for the words, the Universe can evolve, but not the World.
We now need to introduce an ordering relation between events. The prece-
dence relation ≺ defined before for the event space E(X) of a thing X is of no
use now, since we have no things, and hence no states of things, to define such
a relation. We cannot adopt neither a simple relation of “before than”, as Car-
nap (1958), Gru¨nbaum (1973), and Martin (1978) did, because not all events
can be ordered by such a relation without further specification: we know from
relativity theory that such an order can be inverted by choosing an appro-
priate reference system in the case of space-like events. We need to introduce
a stronger structure in the set of all events E, if we want to represent with
such a set the World. To achieve this goal, we stipulate that E is ametric space.
Definition. A set E is a metric space if for any two elements e1 and e2 of
E, there is a real number d(e1, e2), called the distance between e1 and e2 in
accordance with the postulates:
M1. d(e1, e2) = 0 iff e1 = e2.
M2. d(e1, e2) + d(e2, e3) ≥ d(e1, e3) with e3 ∈ E.
Lindenbaum (1928) has demonstrated that from these two axioms it fol-
lows that:
M3. d(e1, e2) = d(e2, e1).
M4. d(e1, e2) ≥ 0.
5 Since the null event is a fiction, it has no ontological import. Its introduction allows to
give to
〈
E,⋆, e0
〉
the same mathematical structure as adopted for a thing-based ontology.
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Now, only in case that d(e1, e3) > 0, we can introduce a precedence rela-
tion between e1 and e3 :
Definition. The event e1 precedes (or is earlier than) the event e3 iff
(∃e2)E [d(e1, e3) ≥ d(e1, e2) + d(e2, e3)].
In short, e1 ≺ e3. Events such that d > 0, d = 0, and d < 0 are called
time-like, null, and space-like events, respectively.
Given any event e ∈ E, we call the future of e the set F = {e′ : d(e, e′) >
0 ∧ e ≺ e′}. Similarly, we define the past of e as the set P = {e′ : d(e, e′) >
0 ∧ ¬(e ≺ e′)}. Notice that every event has its own past and future, that
depends on the metric of the space E. This contradicts the popular claim that
the distinction between past and future requires consciousness. Rather on the
contrary, there is no consciousness without memory, which in turn involves the
past-future distinction, in particular the distinction between the lived and the
expected.
Once we have equipped the set of events with a metric structure, we can
make the fundamental assumption of an event ontology: The World is repre-
sented by a metric space. In symbols:
E=ˆW.
Here, E is a mathematical construct and W is the composition of all events,
i.e. the maximal existent in an event ontology.
A final step in the formulation of our event ontology is the formal con-
struction of things out of events6. In order to achieve this we introduce the
operation of abstraction from a collection of individuals. Let us consider a
formula with a single variable x that runs over events: ‘(− − x − −)’. This
formula can be atomic or complex (build up out of atomic formulae connected
by standard logic functors). The formula predicates of each individual x such
and such a property. We can abstract a virtual (i.e. fictitious) class from such
a formula forming the collection (Martin 1969, p.125):
P = {y : −− y −−}.
Now, things can be constructed as classes of events sharing some properties,
P , Q, etc:
X = 〈P, Q, ...〉 e.
In this way things are bundles of events defined by shared properties, which
are abstracted from conditions imposed on the events. The thing ‘Socrates’,
for instance, is a cluster of events sharing their occurrence in Greece, previous
to such and such other events, including events like ‘talking with Plato’, and
so on. Once things are introduced in this way, we can deal with them as in
6 Notice that I am providing here the foundations of an event ontology. I am not assuming
a thing ontology in this section, so there is no semantic circularity. Rather: my goal is to
show that event and thing ontologies are alternative representations of the same underlying
reality.
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the previous sections. If, instead, we consider things as basic, we can construct
events out of states of things, and once we have a language rich enough as to
have events as values of its variables, we can treat them as primitives. In this
way, the ontic building blocks of our description of the World can be either
things or events. Through both ways we arrive to the same picture of reality,
as we shall see in the next section.
5 The emergence of spacetime
The set of all events, E, is different from the set EL(X) of physically possible
events in a thing X and from the set E of accessible events to all things. The
latter is defined as:
E =
⋃
i
EL(Xi),
where the index i runs over all things. Most events in this set are virtual events
that never occur in actual things; they are just lawful, possible pairs of states.
The events that really occur are those that belong to the history of each thing.
We can connect both ontological views, the thing-based and the event-based
ontologies, through the following definitions:
E = {e : e ∈
⋃
i
h(Xi)}
is the set of all actual changes and,
W = h(U),
is the World. The World is the history of the Universe. In this way, indepen-
dently of the primitive terms in our ontological basis (things or events) we
arrive again to:
E=ˆW.
The mathematical model of the World can be improved imposing some
additional constraints on the set E. To the metric postulates M1 and M2 we
shall add the following postulates:
P1. The set E is a C∞ differentiable, 4-dimensional, real pseudo-Riemannian
manifold.
P2. The metric structure of E is given by a tensor field of rank 2, gab, in such
a way that the differential distance ds between two events is: ds2 = gabdx
adxb.
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A real 4-D manifold is a set that can be covered completely by subsets
whose elements are in a one-to-one correspondence with subsets of ℜ4. The
manifold is pseudo-Riemannian if the tangent space in each element is flat but
not Euclidean. Each element of the manifold represents one (and only one)
event. We adopt 4 dimensions because it seems enough to give 4 real numbers
to provide the minimal characterization of an event. We can always provide a
set of 4 real numbers for every event, and this can be done independently of
the intrinsic geometry of the manifold. If there is more than a single charac-
terization of an event, we can always find a transformation law between the
different coordinate systems. This is a basic property of manifolds.
We introduce now the Equivalence Principle and the characterization of
the metric through two additional postulates:
P3. The tangent space of E at any point is Minkowskian, i.e. its metric is
given by a symmetric tensor ηab of rank 2 and trace −2.
P4. The metric of E is determined by a rank 2 tensor field Tab though the
Einstein field equations:
Gab − gabΛ = κTab. (1)
In these equations Gab is the so-called Einstein tensor, formed by second
order derivatives of the metric. In the second term on the left, Λ is called
the cosmological constant, whose value is thought to be small but not null.
The constant κ on the right side is −8π in units of c = G = 1. Finally, Tab
represents the source of the metric field, and satisfies conservation conditions
(∇bT ab = T ab;b = 0) from which the equations of motion of physical things
can be derived. The solutions of such equations are the histories of things
whose properties are characterized by Tab. Alternatively, the solutions can be
seen as continuous series of events represented on the manifold E. The Einstein
field equations are a set of ten non-linear partial differential equations for the
metric coefficients.
6 Change as asymmetry in a Parmenidean world
Postulates P1 to P4 given in the previous section, with an adequate formal
background (Bunge 1967, Covarrubias 1993, Perez Bergliaffa et al. 1998), im-
ply the theory of general relativity. What we have called the ‘World’, in rel-
ativity theory is known as ‘spacetime’ (ST ). The representation of spacetime
is given by a 4-dimensional manifold equipped by a metric. In standard rela-
tivistic notation:
ST =ˆ 〈E, gab〉 .
We remark that spacetime is not a manifold (i.e. a mathematical construct)
but the “totality” (the composition in our characterization) of all events. A
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specific model of the World requires the specification of the source of the metric
field. As we have seen, this is done through another field, called the “energy-
momentum” tensor field Tab (Hawking and Ellis 1973). Hence, a model of the
World is:
MW = 〈E, gab, Tab〉 .
Since the ontic basis of the model is the totality of events, the World is
ontologically determined. This does not imply that the World is necessarily
predictable from the model. In fact, Cauchy horizons can appear in the manifold
E for many prescriptions of Tab (e.g. Joshi 1993). One thing is the World, and
another our representations of the World.
In the World, objects are 4-dimensional bundles of events (Heller 1990).
Beginning and end, are just boundaries of objects, in the same way that the
surfaces and boundary layers are limits of 3-dimensional slices of such ob-
jects. The child I was, long time ago, is just a temporal part of me. The fact
that these parts are not identical is not mysterious or particularly puzzling,
since spacetime, although changeless itself, is composed of changes. We can
understand such changes as asymmetries in the geometry of spacetime. We
can quantify the intrinsic change rate of spacetime using the Raychaudhuri’s
equation (Raychaudhuri 1955).
Let us consider a time-like vector field ua that is tangent to the geodesics
(basic processes or histories of basic things) of a spacetime ST . We can define
an expansion scalar θ = ∇aua = ua;a, such that if θ > 0 the geodesics fly apart,
if θ < 0 the geodesics come together, and if θ = 0 they remain self-similar.
The Raychaudhuri’s equation provides the evolution of θ with the separation
between events:
dθ
ds
= −
1
3
θ2 − σ + ω −Rabu
aub.
In this equation Rab is the so-called Ricci tensor, that is formed with the
second order derivatives of the metric gab, and σ and ω are parameters that
measure the shear and rotation of the geodesics, respectively. The derivative
dθ/ds gives a measure of the rate of change in the history of the Universe h(U).
If θ = 0 all slices of the World are identical. Only if θ 6= 0 there is change from
one slice to another, and we can say that the Universe evolves (undergoes
change), or, what is the same, that the World presents asymmetries. Change,
then, is an internal relative feature of the World, which, from a global point
of view, is changeless. In Heraclitus words: “By changing it remains at rest”.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I have outlined a formal ontological system that can accommo-
date either things or events as primitive individuals. The result, in any case, is
a Parmenidean view of the World, where change is not possible for the totality
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of the existents. Nonetheless, change plays a fundamental role in the constitu-
tion of the World, as Heraclitus pointed out. In this sense, this work expands
and elaborates on a central theme of Western metaphysics. I remark that the
ontological views presented here are independent of the nature (quantum or
not) of the basic building blocks of the World. An ontology is the most general
theory that can be presented about what there is. It should be wide enough
to accommodate all results of the factual sciences and it should provide a
framework to stimulate further research. As any theory, an ontology should
be testable. Not directly against experiment, but through its cogency with
the totality of our scientific knowledge. It is my hope that the considerations
presented in this paper can be useful as a contribution to a science-oriented
metaphysics, rooted in a tradition initiated by Heraclitus and the Eleatic chal-
lenge to the Ionian concept of change.
Appendix: Metric in the quantum world
It might be thought that in a quantum mechanical description of the world,
the line element cannot be defined because such a description does not con-
tain ‘particle’ coordinates, and hence there are not sharp points or lines. This,
however, is based on a misunderstanding of the metric concept of space-time.
Space-time is formed out of events, not of physical objects such as elemen-
tary particles. The events are ordered pairs of states, in the framework of a
thing-based ontology. States in quantum mechanics are represented by rays in
a rigged Hilbert space. Actually, it is a basic postulate of quantum mechanics
that every quantum system and its environment have an associated Hilbert
space (Bunge 1967; Perez-Bergliaffa et al. 1993, 1996). Changes or events in
quantum mechanics are pairs of rays in the Hilbert space of the system. The
fact that the properties of quantum things only have probabilities (or propen-
sities) of taking sharp values does not preclude change, and hence space-time,
of the quantum description of nature.
Moreover, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory presuppose space-
time (e.g. Perez-Bergliaffa et al. 1996, axioms A1−A5). The usual presentation
of these theories is in a flat, Minkowskian space-time, although they can be
applied with certain caution to curved space-times (see, for instance, Wald
1994). Metric problems can appear only when change cannot be properly de-
fined, as seems to occur around the Planck scale. At this scale, the continuum
hypothesis breaks, and quantum gravity should replace metric gravity (e.g.
Rovelli 2004). But this is neither the time nor the place to discuss the onto-
logical implications of quantum gravity for the theory of change. I’ll be back
on this issue elsewhere.
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